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Abstract
As a consumer of  advanced network enabled equipment the Military (like 
all consumers) has probably become used to a dominant design paradigm; 
the closed, bureaucratic, inflexible, complex, technology laden piece of  
kit which, despite all that, really only permits the user to perform simple 
and arbitrary individual tasks and often only then with arduous training 
and operational effort. This paper attempts to shift that paradigm. From 
the evolution of  military equipment to its co-evolution with human users, 
from a focus on what equipment ‘is’ to what it actually ‘does,’ an argu-
ment for the application of  systems principles to the type of  equipment 
now found in network enabled domains is developed. This enables a set 
of  initial propositions posed at the beginning of  the paper to be elevated 
to the status of  actionable design principles. Drawing widely from the 
domains of  human factors and sociotechnical systems theory a case is 
thus put forward for equipment (and its procurement) to be as open, flex-
ible, agile and self-synchronizing as the net-enabled system into which it is 
designed to operate. 
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Introduction
The Proposition(s)
This paper begins by being deliberately contentious:
Proposition 1. Although it is technically convenient to see items 
of  military equipment as stand-alone, none of  it really exists in 
isolation.
Proposition 2. Equipment design and procurement is often based 
on a set of  inappropriate implicit theories.
Proposition 3. It is not possible to achieve NEC’s aspirations 
through top-down processes of  design alone.
Proposition 4. It is not possible to specify all user requirements at 
the beginning of  the design process. It is not even desirable. 
Proposition 5. Design is not a one-off  process and there is no clear 
end-product.
Proposition 6. Functionality is mostly split across artificial func-
tional boundaries.
Proposition 7. The way that equipment should be used is often 
over-specified.
Proposition 8. Step changes in capability consistently fail to meet 
expectations.
Proposition 9. Design itself  is often not designed.
Proposition 10. And the moment people start using equipment 
they are designing the next version of  it.
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These propositions could have been put forward in the delicately 
nuanced and heavily caveated manner which they ordinarily would 
deserve. We have chosen instead to frame them in deliberately con-
tentious terms because the next task, which is to build a theoretical 
argument to support them, becomes considerably more challenging 
and meaningful. The only caveats that we do need to put in place are 
the following: firstly, these propositions relate to a particular class of  
networked, interoperable equipment that is becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous in 21st century military environments: they by no means 
relate universally to all forms of  equipment. Secondly, the perceptive 
reader will also note that these principles are reminiscent of  Chern’s 
(1976/1987), Davis’ (1977) and Clegg’s (2000) classic ‘principles of  
sociotechnical design.’ This is deliberate too. Whilst we are certainly 
not the first to be as contentious as this we do believe that the prin-
ciples are as relevant now as they always have been. With the advent 
of  NEC, probably more so.
In the sections that follow an alternative vision of  how to think about 
and design this specific class of  military network-enabled equipment 
is presented. A collection of  explicit concepts and theories, some of  
them with a substantial legacy of  practical application, suggest that 
there are fundamentally different ways of  approaching the problem. 
We use the British Army’s digital tactical communications system, 
called Bowman, as an example of  how and why the propositions 
made at the beginning are closer to valid, actionable design prin-
ciples than their contentious nature might at first suggest. 
The Information Age
A number of  attributes qualify the assertion that the Bowman com-
munications system represents an incipient information age system. 
As a product Bowman is, in some senses, less about what it ‘is’ (i.e., a 
collection of  green boxes and cables) but what it is connected to and 
what it ‘does’ (Kelly, 1994). From the users point of  view Bowman 
represents a form of  mobile porthole into a military ‘blogosphere’ 
4       The International C2 Journal | Vol 3, No 2
populated by other people, information and assets. It should enable 
personnel to extract value from this collection of  interconnected 
artifacts, to harness the capability that this provides in order to do 
meaningful ‘Effects Based’ activities easily, only one of  which is talk-
ing to people over the radio. 
If  flexibility, innovation and learning are the hallmarks of  informa-
tion age equipment, then for military audiences used to considerably 
greater degrees of  determinism this brings with it the appearance 
of  an alarming lack of  control. The key issue with this kind of  net-
worked, interoperable equipment, especially when combined with 
greater degrees of  peer-to-peer working and effects based operations 
under the auspices of  NEC, is that it creates the conditions for peo-
ple to ‘discover’ ways of  usefully deploying it. The more flexibility 
and ease-of-use, the more ‘discovery’ potential there is. This means 
that many of  the ways in which current and future functionality will 
connect to what people want to do with it, that is to say the behavior 
of  such equipment, remains as yet undiscovered by users. Whilst the 
generic capability to interact and exchange information has been 
provided, what users decide to do with that capability, how they link 
it to the effects they want to achieve will be up to them: this is the 
essence of  self-synchronisation. 
From the moment users put information age equipment to use the 
perceptive designer will see that a form of  participatory, democratic 
design process is already underway. Thus in some senses Bowman, 
and other net-enabled equipment, is not an ‘end product’ at all, at 
least not in the traditional sense. What has been designed is often 
something more akin to a set of  initial conditions or ‘capabilities,’ a 
system that ‘becomes’ rather than a system that is frozen in time. An 
ongoing process of  user/product evolution and co-evolution will tell 
exactly what. The following sections develop these basic premises 
further.
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 Design Evolution
End Products vs. Initial Conditions
Equipment is not just manufactured it is also ‘designed.’ Because it is 
designed it is subject to a range of  diffuse interconnected influences, 
from competitive and commercial pressures to technology develop-
ments and user requirements. Equipment emerges out of  a wider 
dynamic background and context, in a sense it too evolves, a form of  
natural process within which the designer plays a key role. 
Figure 1. 
7(&+12/2*<1DUURZ 3HUYDVLYH
$0WR)08+)
$QDORJXHWR'LJLWDO
,QVHFXUHWR6HFXUH
&ODQVPDQWR&RPEDW

 Bowman’s (simplified) evolutionary timeline.
Like any system, Bowman has its own evolutionary timeline (Figure 
1), its own inherited traits, its own ‘equipment DNA’ and its own 
adapted state vis-à-vis its environment; at least conceptually. Natural 
evolution, as distinct from the artificial evolution of  equipment, is a 
bottom up process. There is no ‘control’ or ‘design’ as such and com-
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plexity emerges out of  simplicity. Implicit in bottom-up processes 
like natural evolution is a subsumption architecture in which higher 
(complex) levels subsume lower (simple) levels. The rules of  sub-
sumption proposed by Brooks (1986) are instructive for equipment 
designers because they seem to map well onto the verb or capability-
like properties of  information age equipment such as Bowman:
• Step 1: Get the equipment doing simple things first and get them 
working perfectly.
• Step 2: Add new layers of  activity over the results of  the simple 
tasks.
• Step 3: Don’t alter the simple things.
• Step 4: Make the new layer(s) work as perfectly as the layer below.
• Step 5: Repeat…
Bottom-up processes like these are not ideal in every circumstance. 
Neither are top-down processes. As Table 1 shows, design is contin-
gent on the context of  use and the type of  problem a piece of  equip-
ment is meant to be solving.
Table 1. Matrix of  ‘Approach’ vs. ‘Problem’
  Problem 
 Deterministic: i.e. stand-
alone equipment 
Complex: i.e. networked 
systems 
Top Down Matched Rational systems start to 
behave irrationally… 
Ap
pr
oa
ch
 
Bottom Up Too slow and lacks scale… Matched 
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The sort of  artificial ecology that equipment normally resides in, and 
emerges from, exhibits a recognizable form of  evolution but there is 
a combination of  bottom up and top down processes. Achieving a 
balance between the two lies at the heart of  Human Factors Inte-
gration (HFI) processes such as ISO 13407 (ISO, 1999). Achieving 
a balance is easier said than done and the more typical situation is a 
design ecology which is out of  balance. Most common seems to be 
the application of  long-standing top-down processes of  design being 
used to solve complex non-deterministic problems. What typically 
arises from this mismatch are the technologically intensive pieces of  
equipment representative of  the dominant paradigm (bureaucratic, 
inflexible, difficult to use, fails to meet aspirations etc.). 
Opaque vs. Transparent Capability
Let us now examine the bottom-up processes implicit in Bowman’s 
evolutionary pre-history. This can be traced back as far as Morse 
code and the Crimean War. This was the first campaign to use 
electric telegraph and where it is sobering to learn that even then, 
the Commander in Chief  received so many administrative queries 
from London that he was quickly overwhelmed with information. 
Morse Code was gradually superseded by voice telephony (e.g., the 
Boer War), voice telephony eventually led to radio-telephony (used 
to some extent in WWI) and onwards to the recognizably modern 
Larkspur radio system. This in turn was superseded by the light-
weight, modern, but still ostensibly analogue Clansman system until 
the limitations of  that created the conditions for voice and data com-
munications under the aegis of  Bowman. 
Expressed in terms of  subsumption there is an argument to sug-
gest that Morse Code first demonstrated the principle of  electronic 
communications on any meaningful scale. This led to the nascent 
beginnings of  a telecommunications equipment infrastructure. This 
infrastructure, and the capability it afforded, created new uses and 
new aspirations for the system, which in turn paved the way for the 
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next layer; voice telephony. This took the proven technology (of  
electrical signals carried by copper conductors) to the next level, 
enabling voice modulated signals to be carried rather than just dots 
and dashes. Again, this layer worked and served to create new affor-
dances, affordances that helped the principle of  voice telephony to 
break free from its wires through the use of  radio, firstly AM (ampli-
tude modulated and the bulky WWII era wireless sets) then VHF/
FM and the post-war Larkspur and Clansman radios. In each case, 
communications spread further outwards from a ‘strategic’ mode of  
communication (e.g., the Crimean War and London communicating 
with field HQ) to ‘tactical’ (e.g., the Boer War, where field HQ used it 
to direct artillery fire). Presented in this way Bowman’s developmen-
tal pre-history is of  course grossly overly simplified. It is intended 
merely as an illustration (not a detailed historical critique). The key 
point is that the continued outward spread of  communications tech-
nology from strategic to tactical meant that the technology changed 
from being narrow, with specific users and highly defined uses, to 
pervasive, used by nearly every one for all manner of  purposes. 
This process continues. Some of  the technology which is now a famil-
iar part of  military operations is itself  becoming subsumed, a side 
effect of  which is that it becomes increasingly transparent, “weaving 
itself  into the fabric of  everyday life until indistinguishable from it” 
(Weiser, 1990, 94). Of  course, the technology has not become ‘liter-
ally’ invisible, the point is that whilst it would be possible to point 
to and isolate the function that a specific cable or antenna serves, 
from the users perspective there is little point (Weiser, 1990). From 
the users point of  view the behavior of  the Bowman system has 
become largely disconnected from the specific technological artifacts 
that support it. It is the behavior that counts. Despite its heteroge-
neous parts the system as a whole not only works satisfactorily (as per 
Brook’s subsumption rules above) but more importantly it behaves 
coherently (as per Actor Network Theory; Law, 2003). Only when 
the system breaks down does it dissolve into its constituent electronic 
WALKER ET AL. | HFI Principles for NEC System Design       9
components and human interventions, but even then this lack of  
coherency has more meaning for the signals engineer than it does 
for most Bowman users (Law, 2003). 
Centralized vs. Distributed Equipment
Technological invisibility goes hand in hand with another of  Weiser’s 
concepts: ubiquity. In practice what this means is that what a system 
like Bowman ‘does’ has not only been set free from the technology 
that supports it (i.e., the technology is transparent), equally impor-
tant is that it has also been set free from the boundaries of  space and 
location. Through systems like Bowman, information is becoming as 
“dependable, consistent, and pervasive” as an electricity power grid 
(Chetty & Buyya, 2002, 61). As a result, information age equipment, 
whether it be something overtly ‘radio-like’ or something more com-
plex like the various Bowman data terminals, all of  it can be plugged 
in wherever this increasingly pervasive information infrastructure is 
present, from tanks to tents. Moving from left to right along Bow-
man’s evolutionary axis, the difference in innovation and learn-
ing now potentially available to the user is akin to the kind of  step 
change difference in the power of  a product that runs off  a battery 
compared to one that plugs into a mains supply. 
D esign Co-Evolution
Stretched Capability
If  technology is evolving then so to are the users of  it. The sociotech-
nical system, then, is ‘co-evolving.’ According to researchers in the 
field of  Cognitive Systems Engineering (e.g., Hollnagel & Woods, 
2005) technology and complexity are intertwined in precisely this 
way. In broad terms the extra utility afforded by some form of  tech-
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nological advance is usually seized thus “pushing the system back 
to the edge of  the performance envelope,” rather like the motor-
way that is being continually widened and just as continually filled 
(Woods & Cook, 2002, 141). As a result, equipment tends to be run 
to its limits with all that that entails for reliability, stability and com-
plexity (a bigger, wider motorway, at the level of  the total system, 
is a more complex one; Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). The Law of  
Stretched Systems explains this self-reinforcing evolutionary cycle in 
relation to artifacts such as military equipment.
The cycle begins with an identified deficiency, a lack of  capability, 
which is answered by expanding the equipment’s functionality. Func-
tionality is expanded by capitalizing on the extra capability afforded 
by new technology, thus creating a new product which, like the wider 
motorway, is now a more complex one. Consider for a moment the 
functionality/ease of  use afforded by the venerable Clansman radio 
(in which a curly cord to the handset was considered an innova-
tion) and the functionality/ease of  use afforded by a Bowman data 
terminal? An attempt has been made to push the equipment “back 
to the edge of  the performance envelope” and to make the most 
of  what technology now affords (Woods & Cook, 2002, 141). With 
extra capability has come greater task complexity which in turn cre-
ates new opportunities for problems and new deficiencies in capabil-
ity, thus the cycle repeats. 
An undesirable characteristic of  this self-reinforcing cycle is that in 
capitalizing on technology potential the user can often be left “with 
an arbitrary collection of  tasks and little thought may have been 
given to providing support for them” (Bainbridge, 1982, 151). In 
other words, the solution may be technically effective but not ‘jointly 
optimized’ with its human users. Because of  this, human adaptabil-
ity becomes required for equipment to work as intended which, in 
turn, creates new ‘opportunities for malfunction.’ Hollnagel and 
Woods clarify that “by this we do not mean just more opportunities 
for humans to make mistakes but rather more cases where actions 
have unexpected and adverse consequences” (2005, 5). The typical 
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response to this situation is to change the functionality of  the system 
again. This completes the self-reinforcing cycle shown in Figure 2, 
which does not merely cause difficulties but represents an optimum 
strategy for maximizing them (e.g., Norman, 1990). 
Figure 2. 
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Hirshhorn’s Law of  Stretched ‘Equipment’ (Hollnagel & 
Woods, 2005). 
Co-Evolution
A well known maxim in Human Factors is that ‘it is easier to twist 
metal than it is to twist arms’ (e.g., Sanders & McCormick, 1992). In 
other words, it is easier to adapt equipment to its user than to rely 
on them adapting to it. When interpreted literally, it tends to presup-
pose that users do not readily change and that items of  equipment 
can be seen in isolation from their environment. 
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Another way of  looking at this twisting metal vs. arms dialectic is to 
see it as an almost necessarily antagonistic process, such that there is 
“reciprocal evolutionary change” or a little of  both metal and arm 
twisting (Kelly, 1994, 74). Users have their arms twisted by having 
to adapt to new equipment, in turn, the equipment has a little more 
of  its metal bent to suit new needs that arise from this adaptation, 
which creates more new needs, more arm twisting and more metal 
bending, on and on in a spiraling co-evolutionary fashion until the 
original piece of  equipment becomes almost unrecognizable. As 
such, Bowman’s evolutionary timeline says as much about what the 
technology has done to users as the users have done to the technol-
ogy. Users and equipment have become locked more and more into 
a single system, “each step of  co-evolutionary advance winds the 
two antagonists more inseparably, until each other is wholly depen-
dant on the other’s antagonism. The two become one” (Kelly, 1994, 
74; Licklider, 1960). Bowman’s evolutionary pre-history provides an 
interesting example of  this process in action. 
The question to ask is at the birth of  recognizably modern military 
communications technology, who actually ‘needed’ it? The historical 
answer is surprising. At the outset, and for many years following, rel-
atively few people ‘needed it’ and it remained the more or less exclu-
sive province of  strategic communications at headquarters level. Its 
use as a tactical communications medium sprung from being able 
to direct flank formations and artillery fire, with this requirement in 
turn driven by the ability to undertake this sort of  battlefield coor-
dination without the use of  wires. As radio technology improved, 
so did its reliability and resilience, and with it, the requirement for 
wired communications diminished. As technology improved still 
further, equipment became even more mobile, like Clansman. The 
interesting point is that none of  these improvements fundamentally 
altered the nature of  the communications task. It altered the con-
text, the setting and the capability but the task of  speaking into a 
receiver remained ostensibly the same. In equipment design terms 
Clansman was not a radical departure or paradigm shift from the 
antiquated field telephones and wireless sets that preceded it. It was 
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not like Bowman, for example, that needs a critical mass of  other 
Bowmanised bits of  equipment in order to extract its full capability. 
It was merely a new layer of  enhanced technology overlain on top of  
a proven method of  working (i.e., radio communications). 
As Clansman became more widespread and ubiquitous, as users 
and technology became increasingly locked into a single system, the 
metaphorical twisting of  arms required more metal to be twisted. 
Enter Bowman. The step change in capability provided by Bowman 
derives from three areas of  functionality: secure tactical communi-
cations, enhanced situational awareness [sic] (through global posi-
tioning technology) and a reliable data network. All this is designed 
to support the kind of  interaction that users of  Clansman (not to 
mention the Internet, an interacting non-military trend) were com-
ing to expect as they passed through the ‘performance demands’ 
phase of  the self-reinforcing complexity cycle. 
Reciprocal human/technological change continues. Within the 
heavily prescribed method of  working embodied by the software 
suite (which resides on the various Bowman data terminals) a facility 
called Free Text is provided. This is nothing more or less than the 
ability for users to type text, then to send it across the data network 
to any other data terminal user (it is actually a secondary function 
embedded within a much larger super-ordinate capability). Because 
every communication eventuality seems to have been anticipated 
and subsequently incorporated into the software, giving rise to a 
highly specified method of  working and an almost extreme level of  
functionality, it seems unlikely that the simplistic Free Text facility 
would be used all that often. After all, every template and pro-forma 
was provided so no-one really ‘needed to?’
The technological metal of  Clansman was bent into Bowman in 
response to new aspirations, users in turn are adapting Bowman 
technology in surprising ways. During a large scale field trial (see 
Stanton et al., 2009) the effect of  the simple Free Text facility became 
magnified out of  all proportion. In a situation reminiscent of  the 
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explosion in SMS Text Messaging it was observed that out of  all the 
data communications events, 73% of  those initiated by the user were 
Free Text. This is surprising for a function that no one anticipated 
being used very often, if  at all.
Complexity
To paraphrase the classic sociotechnical systems literature: “The 
single most descriptive term for [military] environments is change. This char-
acteristic in itself  is the basis for innovation of  alternative [equipment], since 
the implicit assumption of  [industrial age equipment] was high stability 
or placidity of  the environment” (Davis, 1977, 263). The Larkspur radio 
handset, at one end of  the evolutionary spectrum, has a simple well 
defined capability designed for an enduring context of  use. It is an 
end product. Bowman, on the other hand, has the potential for 
through-life capability. Whether it’s innate flexibility and adaptive-
ness is seen explicitly as this or not, Bowman is designed for an alto-
gether more dynamic environment, as “a system designed to keep 
pace with technology” (MoD, 2008). 
The problem with complex entities and environments is that they 
begin not to “…function in the linear ways in which we are used 
to thinking and analyzing” (Smith, 2006, 40). “[A]ctions are both 
persistent and strong enough to induce autochthonous processes in 
the environment” (Emery & Trist, 1965, 29). The self-reinforcing 
co-evolutionary cycle is one such autochthonous process, a type of  
positive feedback loop which means that “the consequences which 
flow from…actions lead off  in ways that become increasingly unpre-
dictable: they do not necessarily fall off  with distance, but may at any 
point be amplified beyond all expectation [like Free Text]; similarly, 
lines of  action that are strongly pursued may find themselves atten-
uated by emergent field forces [like overall system performance]” 
(Emery & Trist, 1965, 29). As a result, step changes in capability of  
the sort represented by Bowman are embarked upon with extreme 
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caution. If  the resultant system is not jointly optimized with users 
then the inevitable adaptations that they will perform will normally 
lead to the latter outcome rather than the former.
Interaction Pull and Technology Push
The graphical depiction of  coevolution and the shift to informa-
tion age equipment shown in Figure 3, which is adapted from the 
work of  Alberts, Gartska & Stein, (1999), represents a good sum-
mary for this section. Here it can be seen that an interactional y-axis 
has been added to Bowman’s evolutionary timeline and the effect 
of  co-evolutionary arm and metal twisting, of  interaction and tech-
nology push, spirals forward in time. The interesting fact about this 
co-evolutionary spiral is that whilst it does indeed lead to complexity 
it does not necessarily lead to chaos: “By incrementally extending 
new structure beyond the bounds of  its initial state, [an information 
age system] can build its own scaffolding to build further structure…
with no bounds in sight” (Kelly, 1994, 22-23). 
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Figure 3. 
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Interaction pull, technology push and equipment co-evolu-
tion (adapted from Alberts, Gartska & Stein, 1999). 
Open S ystems Behavior 
Object or System? 
Formal systems thinking is “…a framework for conceptualizing or 
viewing the world” (Carvajal, 1983, 230). Although not always seen 
in this way, the special case of  networked, interoperable equipment 
can be seen as “…a set of  interrelated elements” (Hall & Fagen, 
1956 cited in Carvajal, 1983) and a “regularly interacting or inter-
dependent group of  items forming a unified whole” (Merriam-Web-
ster, 2003). Metcalfe’s Law brings home the point behind looking at 
information age equipment in this way: “as the number of  [parts in 
a system] increases linearly the potential ‘value or effectiveness’ of  
WALKER ET AL. | HFI Principles for NEC System Design       17
the [system] increases exponentially” (Alberts et al., 1999). Informa-
tion age systems like Bowman have more parts (not just Clansman-
esque handsets but data terminals and more), more interconnections 
and potentially more value. The point of  applying systems thinking 
to the type of  equipment that lives in this networked environment is 
to try and harness such potential. 
Objects vs. Networks
The term ‘network’ has a very different meaning in systems theory 
than it might in the world of  NEC (where it is often attributed to the 
networked technology underlying it). In systems theoretic terms the 
extent to which a piece of  equipment’s ‘parts’ and ‘interconnections’ 
can be specified determines whether it has the systemic properties 
of  an ‘object’ or a ‘network.’ The characteristics of  an object bring 
to mind a relatively simple device such as the legacy Clansman radio 
handset. The characteristics of  a ‘network’ are better aligned with 
the flexible, adaptable, information age attributes that technology 
like Bowman should offer. Looking at Bowman’s evolutionary time-
line it can be noted that the equipment on the left of  the axis seems 
to exhibit object-like properties. They are, or tend to be:
• concerned with the attainment of  a relatively specific goal,
• have well specified criteria for deciding on optimum means to 
ends, and
• have a “high degree of  formalization” (Scott, 1992).
According to Scott (1992) this is the definition of  a closed or ratio-
nal system. This is a system containing parts that have well speci-
fied input/output characteristics and interconnections with known 
properties and flows. An electrical circuit diagram would be a good 
visual metaphor for such a system. The outputs of  one component 
form the input to another, the behavior of  the component and the 
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connection itself  being well defined. It is often not just the technical 
parts of  a product that are made to yield to closed systems thinking. 
The original Clansman handset, for example, has other well defined 
input characteristics. Users lift the handset from its cradle, enter a 
number on the keypad and speak into the mouthpiece when they 
hear someone on the other end. The output characteristics are also 
definable, in so far as they are represented by the sound of  a voice 
coming out of  the earpiece. The first user is linked to the second user, 
functionally, by a simple two way informational link. Obviously, it is 
possible to delve into greater detail but this is the essential essence 
of  a Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) for this piece of  equipment. 
A domestic telephone of  similar design has around ten goals/opera-
tions in its HTA, which means for all practical purposes the use of  
a Clansman radio exploits the full, albeit limited capabilities of  the 
equipment and there is only one way to achieve an end state (which 
is the way the designer has provided). Equipment like this seems to 
make certain tacit assumptions about human users. The logic runs 
as follows:
• Rationality – the user, like the equipment, can be assumed to 
behave rationally. There is a well defined end state and optimum 
prescribed ways of  reaching those end states, which the user will 
follow logically and consistently. 
• Linearity – “the whole will be equal to the sum of  the parts; …
the outputs will be proportionate to the inputs; …the results will 
be the same from one application to the next; …there is a repeat-
able, predictable chain of  causes and effects.” (Smith, 2006, 40). 
This applies equally to both the human ‘socio’ elements of  a 
system and its technical parts.
• Stability – end states, routes to end states, the context of  use, the 
needs and preferences of  users and the human system interac-
tion remain static and enduring. 
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By only offering limited and simple functionality these assumptions 
are to some extent made tenable. It is certainly appropriate for the 
mono-functional Clansman handset but raises important questions 
for the ‘multi-functional’ Bowman system. The HTA for the software 
system residing on Bowman’s data terminals, for example, comfort-
ably exceeds 300 goals/operations, not including an increasingly 
elaborate and expanding array of  complex work-arounds. Not only 
are there considerably more tasks but there are also more ‘plans’ that 
cue their enactment which, according to Annett’s second principle of  
human performance, requires considerably more skill on the part of  
human users (e.g., Annett et al., 1971). However, the more complex 
the equipment becomes, and if  it still adheres to the logic of  simple 
machines, then the more it will have to rely on a prescribed form of  
human interaction. In practice, of  course, it often yields a complex 
form of  human adaptability in order to make it work as the designer 
intended. The real-world consequences of  this are that what start 
out as highly rational products quite often degenerate into irratio-
nality. From an equipment design perspective, instead of  remaining 
efficient equipment rapidly degenerates into inefficiency as a result 
of  its bureaucratic top-down design and poor usability. Systems then 
become unpredictable as users grow unclear about what they are 
supposed to do and do not get the outcome they expect. “All in all, 
what were designed to be highly Rational [systems] often end up 
growing quite irrational” (Ritzer, 1993, 22). The hallmark of  this 
can be seen in many large-scale projects, all of  which meet their 
contractually enshrined requirements yet still exhibit paradoxical 
‘anti-synergistic’ behavior (e.g., Morris & Hough, 1987). 
Information age systems are different, or at least they should be. 
Here, users can do many things with the same piece of  equipment, 
reaching the same end states from different initial conditions and in 
different ways. Information age equipment is not concerned merely 
with the attainment of  specific goals but also as yet unspecified ones. 
Information age products should link users more closely to the kind 
of  real-life ‘effects based’ tasks they want to perform, which means 
that if  human adaptability is required then it is because of  co-evolu-
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tionary needs rather than an artificial prescribed form of  adaptability 
and work-arounds. Rather than a circuit diagram, with known prop-
erties, moving up the vertical/structural axis from micro-systems to 
systems of  systems, a more appropriate visual metaphor might be 
a block, Venn or influence diagram, one in which the properties 
and links are no less extant but more loosely specified. This type of  
equipment exhibits the systemic property of  a network rather than 
an object. 
Open Systems, Steady States and Equifinality
The idea of  a network brings along with it several useful concepts, 
the first of  which is that of  the ‘open system.’ “A system is closed 
if  no material enters or leaves it; it is open if  there is import and 
export and, therefore, change of  the components” (Bertalanffy, 
1950, 23). “The ‘open’ perspective implies that the social and tech-
nological dimensions of  [equipment] must be designed not only in 
relation to each other, but also with reference to evolving environ-
mental demands” (Mitchell & Nault, 2003, 2). Open systems have 
boundaries with other systems and there is some form of  meaning-
ful exchange between them. An exchange that is not constrained by 
machine-like assumptions imposed upon human users. 
“A closed system must, according to the second law of  thermody-
namics, eventually attain a time-independent equilibrium state, with 
maximum entropy and minimum free energy” (Bertalanffy, 1950, 
23). A Clansman radio can exhibit ‘time-independent states’ with 
‘maximum entropy,’ at least conceptually. These high-level systems 
concepts make such a device look like it is developmentally frozen; 
it performs one simple task in one simple environment, it cannot be 
changed or updated, there are no ‘firmware upgrades,’ no plug-ins 
and no add-ons. With a real-life change in the environment from 
analogue to high capacity digital communications the Clansman 
system couldn’t inherently adapt so the British Army had to with-
draw them and undertake a step-change to Bowman. 
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An open system, on the other hand, “may attain (certain conditions 
presupposed) a time-independent state where the system remains 
constant as a whole…though there is a constant flow of  the compo-
nent materials. This is called a steady state” (Bertalanffy, 1950, 23). 
Steady state behavior is an attribute of  information age equipment 
and systems: “They grow by processes of  internal elaboration. They 
manage to achieve a steady state while doing work. They achieve 
a quasi-stationary equilibrium in which the enterprise as a whole 
remains constant, with a continuous ‘throughput,’ despite a con-
siderable range of  external changes” (Trist, 1978, 45). The behav-
ior and capability inherent in the various data terminals and other 
Bowman equipment is, to a significant degree, dependent upon the 
live, dynamic, information infrastructure that they are connected 
to. If  Bowman was suddenly turned off, and with it the constant 
import and export of  information, then all the data terminals would 
become closed systems and to all intents and purposes frozen and of  
limited use. Their capability exists as a steady state, a form of  “stable 
instability” (Kelly, 1994, 78) for which the following represents a new 
implicit design theory:
• Irrationality – “people using the new [system] interpret it, amend 
it, massage it and make such adjustments as they see fit and/or 
are able to undertake” (Clegg, 2000, 467). They will adapt them-
selves and the equipment to suit their needs and preferences, 
which creates behavior that is divergent from the normative, 
rational behavior anticipated by designers (Hollnagel, 2005). 
• Non-linearity – Industrial age closed systems are often designed 
from the top down. In systems terms, parts and interconnec-
tions are well defined and they are thus designed to be ‘homo-
pathic,’ that is, the ‘whole’ is designed to be equal to the sum of  
the ‘parts.’ Information age products can exhibit heteropathic 
effects which means that they can become more than the sum of  
their parts. Capability, therefore, can be emergent and not trace-
able to any one cause or individual. To use Johnson’s (2003, 1) 
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definition, these emergent properties are “unexpected behaviors 
that stem from the interaction between the components [people] 
…and their environment.” 
• Equifinality – end states, routes to end states, the context of  use 
and the needs and preferences of  users are dynamic and change-
able. “There are different ways of  achieving the same purpose” 
(Majchrzak, 1997) from different initial conditions and by differ-
ent means. 
What information-age design is confronted with is not an either/or 
situation. The challenges of  network-enabled system design can be 
partly explained by both the deterministic, industrial-age techniques 
of  old just as much as they can by the probabilistic, information-age 
techniques of  today (and the future). The key is ensuring that human 
factors approaches match the extant nature of  problems.
The enduring dialectic throughout this paper has been ‘from’ some-
thing ‘to’ something else. From ‘is’ to ‘does,’ from ‘simplicity’ to 
‘complexity,’ from ‘linearity’ to ‘non-linearity.’ If  each of  these tran-
sitions are ascribed an intersecting axis then a three dimensional 
space is created that describes in more detail where the Army’s 
tactical communications has come from and where it is heading to 
(Figure 4). One set of  implicit theories, dominant design paradigms 
and conceptual languages applies to where tactical comms has been. 
The purpose so far has been to establish a foothold into the new 
implicit theories, emergent paradigms and conceptual languages 
applicable to where Bowman, and all information age equipment 
like it, is heading towards. 
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Figure 4. 
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From Industrial to Information Age products (based 
loosely on NATO, 2006).
Conclusions
This paper began with a deliberately contentious set of  propositions 
which, given the arguments and evidence just presented, are per-
haps rendered a little less contentious than they might have seemed 
at the beginning. The polemic tone of  this paper continues, however, 
with an observation that perhaps many readers will recognize: the 
presence of  an almost perverse form of  isolationism which looks 
upon military equipment as a special case. That may be true, and if  
it is it certainly brings with it some special problems. Here we have 
equipment that is most often built from scratch by specialist mili-
tary suppliers, technically optimized through top-down processes of  
requirements capture, which themselves are rendered acutely neces-
sary because it is against these that the highly complex legal relation-
ship between supplier and customer (i.e., the tax payer) is enshrined. 
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The prevailing climate is one in which there is nothing whatsoever 
in common with civilian equipment (i.e., products). Military equip-
ment is serious. 
Despite that, problems do arise and in this respect the military really 
is unique. Here problems can be ‘trained out.’ This provides an arti-
ficially soft landing for many non-jointly optimized pieces of  equip-
ment, with military personnel ‘bludgeoning it into submission’ (in the 
words of  front-line personnel) and thereby masking the fact that they 
are not jointly optimized in the first place. The military is unique 
because that sort of  luxury is not afforded to parallel technology in 
civilian domains, for which professionalism, perseverance and ‘train-
ing it out’ are simply not an option. For military users when will the 
limits of  this adaptation be reached? When does the need to blud-
geon a piece of  equipment into submission and ‘train it out’ outstrip 
the capability a new piece of  equipment provides? The introduction 
of  networked, interoperable equipment under the aegis of  network 
enabled capability seems to be pushing this adaptation to its limits. 
What might a good information age piece of  equipment look like? 
Unfortunately, it would probably not look like many examples of  
equipment currently finding its way into NEC, all of  which is a far 
cry from most contemporary PC based computers which themselves 
are far from perfect. But at least they have been allowed to co-evolve 
with their users to some extent, which means they rely on a lot of  
hard-won usage conventions (standardized left and right mouse 
button clicks are one example). A lot of  NEC equipment is a far 
cry indeed from some of  the more pioneering consumer electronic 
devices that manage to combine similarly extreme levels of  func-
tionality with extreme usability, not all of  them by any means, but 
a lack of  joint optimization is quickly punished by a hard landing 
and better competition. Consider mobile phones, the civilian tacti-
cal communications equivalent. The example might sound trivial 
but behind the brand attributes are serious pieces of  technology with 
similar sized HTA’s to Bowman’s data terminals. And all this con-
tained in a highly portable device with a fraction of  the button count 
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and no opportunity (let alone desire) to train anything out. The new 
iPhone is a particularly trivial sounding example, but here is an even 
more powerful device which dispenses with a keypad altogether and 
only has one button: on/off. 
No one is suggesting that military equipment needs to literally look 
like this, but the trend towards convergence, towards outward sim-
plicity (built on subsumed and transparent inner complexity) rests on 
the idea that for all its vicissitudes the information age is not really, in 
itself, the problem. It is the design of  the equipment that goes with it. 
This is because the rate “at which uncertainty overwhelms [a piece 
of  equipment] is related more to its internal structure than to the 
amount of  environmental uncertainty” (e.g., Carvajal, 1983). Sitter, 
Hertog and Dankbaar (1997) offer two strategies that can be applied 
to networked, interoperable military equipment:
“The first option is to restore the fit with the external complexity by 
an increasing internal complexity.” This is an acknowledged fact of  
Bowman. It is “an extremely complex system that brings together a 
range of  software functionality in a number of  different hardware 
configurations. All of  this in turn needs to be integrated with an 
array of  platforms” (MoD, 2008). The alternative offered by a socio-
technical perspective is to: “…deal with the external complexity by 
reducing the internal control and coordination needs.” This option 
might be called the strategy of  simple equipment that enables peo-
ple to do complex, real-life, effects-based tasks. The paradox, then, 
is that a good information age system is one that deals with external 
complexity not by a corresponding increase in its complexity (at least 
as far as the user is concerned) but by actually reducing complexity. 
All that has been discussed up until this point now comes to bear. 
The hallmark of  information age design is subsumption, transpar-
ent, ubiquitous and flexible technology, in a word, the application 
of  open-systems principles to equipment which should be as ‘self-
synchronizing’ as the system within which it resides. To achieve this, 
design itself  requires designing and thus we return to the proposi-
26       The International C2 Journal | Vol 3, No 2
tions made at the start of  this paper which we now recast as a set 
of  overlapping, non-orthogonal ‘principles’ which draw inspiration 
from Cherns (1976/1987), Davis (1977) and Clegg (2000):
Principle 1. Information age equipment relies on open systems 
characteristics. There is constant import and export of  information 
between it and a wider informational infrastructure of  other users, 
devices, equipment etc. The structure and type of  these interactions 
is as much of  a determinate of  the equipment’s purpose and func-
tion as the piece of  equipment itself. This principle, therefore, is all 
about a shift in thinking from design being good at ‘doing the parts’ 
to design becoming good at ‘doing the interconnections.’ This in 
turn relies on MULTI-DISCIPLINARY INPUT and a recognition 
that EQUIPMENT DOES NOT EXIST IN ISOLATION. 
Principle 2. There is a requirement to match design approaches/
methods/techniques to the fundamental nature of  the problem/
environment within which equipment will reside: IMPLICIT THE-
ORIES NEED TO BE TESTED.
Principle 3. “…design choices are contingent and do not neces-
sarily have universal application” (Clegg, 2000, 468). What works in 
one situation and context may not work in another. Design choices 
may themselves have unintended consequences, creating effects that 
can become magnified or attenuated out of  all proportion. In com-
plex systems, one strategy for dealing with this is to use BOTTOM-
UP PROCESSES BASED ON SUBSUMPTION (although see 
Principle 2).
Principle 4. The traditional conception of  design is to respond 
to “some articulated need” (e.g., Clegg, 2000, 466) yet, as we have 
argued, information age equipment may embody ‘needs’ that will 
be subsequently discovered by users, users that may not even be 
the anticipated benefactors of  the equipment. USER REQUIRE-
MENTS CO-EVOLVE and will only unpack themselves over time 
as the equipment is put to use. 
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Principle 5. Users of  equipment “interpret it, amend it, massage it 
and make such adjustments as they see fit and/or are able to under-
take” (Clegg, 2000, 467). Information age equipment increases the 
opportunities for this adaptation as well as the speed with which 
this adaptation creates new co-evolutionary requirements. As such: 
DESIGN FOR ADAPTABILITY AND HIGH TEMPO.
Principle 6. A meaningful real-life task is one in which the user 
experiences a full and coherent cycle of  activities, a task that has 
‘total significance’ and ‘dynamic closure’ (Trist & Bamforth, 1951, 
6). DESIGN USEFUL, MEANINGFUL, EFFECTS-BASED 
WHOLE TASKS.
Principle 7. “…one should not over-specify how a [product] will 
work… . Whilst the ends should be agreed and specified, the means 
should not” (Clegg, 2000, 472). Here we are talking about an open, 
democratic, flexible type of  technology that users can tailor to suit 
their own needs and preferences, in other words: MINIMAL CRIT-
ICAL SPECIFICATION.
Principle 8. Equipment should be congruent with existing prac-
tices which may on occasion appear archaic compared to what tech-
nology now offers. Congruence capitalizes on HARD WON CO-
EVOLUTION AND EQUIPMENT DNA.
Principle 9. DESIGN IS ITSELF AN INFORMATION-AGE 
ENTITY and just as amenable to the same information age insights. 
There is clearly a paradox if  NEC capability is being designed and 
procured according to ‘industrial age’ principles.
Principle 10. USERS OR ‘PROSUMERS’: “We, the users of  the 
new equipment, are finding ways of  exploiting its capabilities and 
thus helping you, the designers, to provide us with new capabilities.” 
From the moment users set information age equipment on the road 
to co-evolution, the perceptive designer will see that the design of  
future capabilities is already underway.
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Note
This paper remarks on a number of  benefits and drawbacks of  the 
Bowman system. This judgement is based entirely on information 
available in the public domain (specifically, the MoD website). The 
authors also wish to acknowledge the resources and information 
available at the Royal Signals Museum located at Blandford Camp 
in Dorset, UK.
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